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Abstract 
The Virtual machine monitor and container is an example of virtualization engine technologies that are currently in wide use. 
Both types of virtualization engines have vulnerabilities that could hamper a virtual machine. In our previous work, we created a 
resilient server using virtualization technologies with a single virtualization engine. To improve the resilience of the server, we 
use two different types of virtualization engines that monitor and respond by the SRN manager. The experiments results show 
that using multiple virtualization engines could cover their vulnerabilities against limited scenarios of failure.  
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Peer-review under responsibility of KES International. 
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1. Introduction 
Server existence becomes critical in an information system since its core functionality is to provide and process 
information required by users. Currently, server technologies have shifted from traditional to an era of virtual 
architecture as shown in Fig.1. Virtual machine (VM) is an implementation of virtual architecture. Although VM’s 
have weaknesses and challenges that have yet to be solved11, they are still very popular as they offer a lot of benefits 
(i.e. portability and energy efficiency).  There are several types of VM model that will be used in this paper that will 
be discussed in Section 5.  
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Fig. 1. Architecture of traditional (right figure) and virtual (left figure) server. 
 
Since the server plays such an important role in an information system, we have to preserve its functionality. 
When the servers encounter a failure, the information system is hampered. Some scenarios that cause the server to 
stop functioning are hang, denial of service (DoS) attack, and computer virus. We never know when, how or how 
often this failure will occur. Thus, many researchers have tried to prevent and solve the problem by involving some 
type of mechanism. Fault injection framework6 is used as a hang detection process used to find the hang problem. 
While, SecondDEP9 is introduced to prevent a zero-day attack on a Windows operating system (OS). ReVirt7 can 
conduct an analysis of intrusion through virtual-machine logging and replay. 
We have simulated a resilient server using XEN18 as a virtual machine monitor (VMM) and compare the 
performance using Docker as a container. Docker with container technology performs faster and is more resource 
efficient than VMM20. However, VMM provides higher diversity than container19 since VMM is able to virtualize 
the hardware environment for their VM rather than sharing the kernel of the host operating system. We need to 
increase the diversity of the server with an aim to decrease failures that occur on the server. This paper presents a 
new model of a resilient server by combining the VMM and container by implementing a self-repair network (SRN) 
model8. 
2. Related Work 
One of the mechanisms available for the server in order to avoid system failure is by the utilization of a fault-
tolerant system where the key point of a fault-tolerant system is redundancy16. Fault-Tolerant focuses on "passive 
action" where the system continues functioning without major changes, while a resilient server focuses on "active 
action" where the system is able to adapt to environmental changes by changing fundamental methods or structures. 
The idea of increasing the diversity of resilient server is inspired by the diversity of an operating system10 where 
the diversity is focused on the kernel modules of the operating system. Since the current server architecture uses 
virtual machine technology, we can have a higher diversity of operating systems than with traditional architecture as 
shown in Fig. 1. Meanwhile, the recovery model of the server to maintain functionality when failures occur is 
motivated by an immunity-based system8 that will be discussed in Section 4. Further, we have to consider that 
Internet services (e.g., DNS) are required to be secured from a cyber-attack. Our work is focused on making the 
server more resilient against cyber-attack by involving virtual machine technology13 and it is inspired by the concept 
of biological diversity17. 
3. Resilient Server 
We have created two types of resilient servers: a homogeneous and a heterogeneous resilient server. Further, we 
create several VM's that we refer to as nodes. Each of the resilient servers has their advantages and disadvantages. 
The homogeneous resilient server offers a facility to replace or copy the failed part from the other nodes. However, 
the homogeneous resilient server has the same vulnerability on all of the nodes, since they have the same structure.  
Meanwhile, the heterogeneous resilient server offers a higher diversity of node that makes the node become more 
resilient than the homogeneous resilient server though the heterogeneous resilient server cause higher operating cost 
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for setup, operation and maintain the entire server since it has the diversity of server. Therefore, we need to increase 
the diversity of the heterogeneous resilient server.   
3.1. Homogeneous resilient server 
On our previous research18,20, we created a homogeneous resilient server using virtual machine monitor (VMM) 
and container technology as the virtualization engine. There are two types of VMM: native and hosted. Native 
VMM structure consists of three layers (hardware, VMM, and Guest OS) while hosted VMM structure consists of 
four layers (hardware, host OS, VMM, and guest OS). We created the homogeneous resilient server with four nodes 
running the same structure (e.g., operating system, disk partition, service types, etc.) using native VMM as shown in 
Fig. 2a. In addition, we created the homogeneous resilient server using container technology since it offers higher 
performance than VMM.  
3.2. Heterogeneous resilient server 
Similar to the homogeneous resilient server, we create the heterogeneous resilient server using VMM and 
container technology19. Further, in contrast to the homogeneous resilient server, we can create several types of 
heterogeneous resilient server with some combination of virtualization engine, guest OS and applications (services) 
as shown in Table 1. Type 1 of resilient server shows as a homogeneous resilient server since there is no different 
combination (X) of virtualization engine, guest OS and application on each node.  Meanwhile, type 2 to type 8 
shows as the heterogeneous resilient server since there is a different combination (O) on each node. Fig. 2b 
illustrates the structure of the heterogeneous resilient server with type 3 or type 4. 





Guest OS Application 
(Service) 
Type 1 X X X 
Type 2 X X O 
Type 3 X O X 
Type 4 X O O 
Type 5 O X X 
Type 6 O X O 
Type 7 O O X 
Type 8 O O O 
 
Both of them, homogeneous and heterogeneous resilient servers are equipped with an application that monitors 
and responds to the failures that occur on the nodes. This application is created by implementing the self-repair 
network (SRN) model and called the SRN manager. Fig. 2 shows that each of physical servers is running the SRN 












(a)                                                                                        (b) 
 
Fig. 2. Structure of (a) the homogeneous and (b) heterogeneous resilient server. 
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In this paper we build a resilient server with type 8, which aims to increase the diversity of the resilient server by 
combining two different virtualization engine technologies (VMM and container). The detail of the design is 
explained in Section 5. 
4. The Self-Repair Network (SRN) Model On The Resilient Server 
There are two main basic models of self-repair network (SRN) model (self-repair and mutual-repair)8. Further, 
these two models are extended into four models of SRN (mixed-repair and switching-repair). All of the SRN 
models are implemented to the SRN manager (discussed in Section 5.2), which is executed on the homogenous and 
heterogeneous resilient server. Details of the SRN model are as follows: 
4.1. Self-repair model  
When the nodes encounter a failure (e.g. hang), we implement the self-repair model to recover the node from its 
faulty state. The self-repair model has a characteristic to repair their part or component. Hang is one of the failures 
that are hard to be recovered6. However, through VM technology, we can realize the self-repair to recover the hang 
failure that occurs to the node by resetting the node. This solution cannot guarantee that the failure will not happen 
in the future, but this solution can be an alternative way for the node to keep running services while the 
administrator investigates the problem. 
4.2. Mutual-repair model 
Another failure that possibly occurs to the server is with the alteration of files on a server such as web contents. 
For example, attackers modify web contents in order to insert some iframe elements so that the attacker redirects 
user’s access to their exploit kit server that attacks various vulnerabilities on a PC. The mutual-repair is 
implemented to solve this kind of problem since it has the characteristic to repair the other nodes. When the 
alteration is detected by a security tool such as Tripwire, the missing or modified files can be copied from the other 
nodes as long as they have the same structure or composition. However, we need to be aware of the "double edge 
sword" phenomena8 since copying from the other nodes is not the best solution to solve the problem. In addition, 
mutual-repair is not a viable solution unless the vulnerability that allows the attacker to modify files on the server 
can be solved. 
4.3. Mixed-repair model 
The combination of the self-repair and the mutual-repair model is a mixed-repair model. This model can be 
implemented to repair the node from a fault occurring from such an event as a denial of service (DoS) attack. This 
attack often happens when a hacker tries to hamper services (e.g. web services), and we assume that the DoS attack 
is based on TCP. DoS attacks work by sending a lot of TCP connections to particular services in order to make those 
services unable to process requests from normal users. Since the mixed-repaired is applied, the implementation of 
self-repair is reflected when a hacker attacks a node, then the attacked node responds by adding the IP address of the 
attacker to the firewall rule. Further, the attacked node informs the virtualization engine where the attacked node 
runs to drop all of the connections that come from the hackers IP address in order to secure the other nodes. 
Whereby, the implementation of mutual-repair is reflected when the attacked node informs the IP address of the 
attacker to the different virtualization engines to secure their nodes. 
4.4. Switching-repair model 
In the heterogeneous environment, the biggest challenge for the node is how to replace the faulty part from the 
other nodes when they have a different structure. For a solution to this problem, we can implement a switching-
repair model, which works by replacing the failure node with the normal node rather than fixing the faulty part. This 
solution is more expensive compared to the other model since we have to provide a normal node to replace the 
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faulty node. However this solution offers higher resilience when compared to the other model since it provides a 
higher diversity of nodes. 
5. System Design and Implementation 
It is not only the applications or the guest operating systems that may have a failure but virtualization engines 
also may have a risk of failure during operation. To reduce the risk of failures that can possibly occur on 
virtualization engines we provide multiple virtualization engines and an SRN manager. Fig. 3 shows the design of 
the network for the experiment where we used three physical servers for VMM, Container, and SRN Manager. 
While, the description of multiple virtualization engines and SRN manager is explained as follows: 
5.1. Multiple virtualization engines 
To actualize type 8 of the resilient server on Table 1, we need to use a distinct virtualization engine on each of 
the physical server machines. Virtualization engine is an environment where the VM executed. If the virtualization 
engine fails, then all the VM running on it will stop functioning. Therefore, we have to preserve the existence of the 
virtualization engine by providing an alternative VM technology to prevent failure on the virtualization engines 
(e.g., CVE-2016-15715, CVE-2014-88663). There are two VM technologies that we use in this paper (VMM and 
container). The combination of them will give the advantage of increasing diversity at the virtualization engines 
level. Since the VMM is used for server operation, accordingly XEN as native VMM are chosen. We choose XEN 
as native VMM since it is freeware and successful (i.e., Citrix Suites). Further, XEN provides flexibility and ease of 
integration14 with other applications and programming libraries to support the SRN Manager. The other 
virtualization engines that we use as container is LXC. We use LXC since it has simple design, which makes the 
LXC have less vulnerability. Further, LXC provides a facility to configure the network for the VM2 without 
involving the other application (e.g., iptables command). Fig. 4 shows the system design of the resilient server 
with type 8 where the virtualization engine is different on each physical server machine. Table 2 shows the detail of 
the specification on each of the physical server machines. This table show the diversity of OSes although the LXC 






















Fig. 3. Design of the network for the experiment. 
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                    Table 2. The detail of the specification on each physical server machine 
Virtualization Engines Guest OS Build number (release) Kernel version Application 
VMM (XEN) Debian GNU/Linux 7.8 (Wheezy) 3.2.0-4-amd64 Apache 
Ubuntu 12.04 (Precise) 3.11.0-15-generic Apache Tomcat 
Fedora 22 4.0.4-301.fc22.x86_64 Nginx 
Windows 7 7601 - IIS 
Container (LXC) CentOS 6.7 (Final) 3.16.0-4-686-pae Lighttp 
Debian GNU/Linux 8 (Jessie) 3.16.0-4-686-pae Apache Tomcat 
Fedora 23 3.16.0-4-686-pae Apache 

















    Fig. 4. Resilient server with two different virtualization engines. 
5.2. SRN Manager 
As described in Section 4, the SRN manager implements the SRN model to solve several failures that possibly 
occur on the server. Therefore, we need to assume some scenarios of failures that could be addressed by the SRN 
manager. In this paper, we define three scenarios of failure related to our previous works18,19: (1) hang, (2) DoS 
attack, and (3) malware. When the SRN manager detects unusual activity (e.g., DoS attack), then it will respond by 
utilizing the virtualization engine feature. Since we use multiple virtualization engines, we have to accommodate all 
of the virtualization engines features. For example, when a hang failure happens on the XEN then the SRN manager 
has to reset the node using a command as follows:  
# xmreset<Domain>  
or we also can reboot the the node by this command: 
     # xmreboot<Domain> 
A different way to reset the node when the hang failure happens on the LXC is for the SRN manager to reset the 
node using the following command:  
# lxcŞstopŞn<container_name>  
and we can continue to start the node using the following command: 
# lxcŞstartŞn<container_name> 
Another example of the failure is when the node is being attacked by a DoS attack. When a particular IP address 
is suspected to be from an attacker, the SRN manager updates the firewall rule to all of the virtualization engines in 
order to protect all of the nodes. Since XEN and LXC using the same host OS, we can use the same command to 
update the firewall rule using iptables to drop the forwarded packet that heads toward the other nodes1. Here is 
the iptables command to drop the forwarded command that lead to the other nodes: 
#iptables–IFORWARD–s<attackerIPaddress>ŞjDROP
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There are two options where the SRN manager can be placed. The first option, we can place the SRN manager 
outside of the physical server. The second option, we can place the SRN manager inside one of the physical servers. 
In this work we use the first option for the design since this options offer ease and simple of code, however this 
option weaker than the second option. Further, we use the Secure Shell (SSH) protocol to communicate between the 
SRN manager and the remote physical server. One example to instruct the virtualization engine on the remote 
physical server is by executing the following command:  
# ssh<hosttarget>“<commandŞtoŞresetŞthe—faultyŞnode>” 
To optimize the communication between the SRN manager and the remote physical server, we can use public key 
authenticaton12.  
6. Experiment Results 
Based on the design that was shown in Fig. 3, we test the response of SRN manager when the nodes encounter a 
failure based on the scenario that was already mentioned in Section 5.2.  The goal of the experiment is to know the 
advantages of the diversity of the virtualization engine for the existence of the nodes by comparing the result of this 
work (type 8 of resilient server) with the other types of resilient server that are using the same virtualization engines 
(e.g., type 2 to type 4). 
6.1. Hang 
On type 8 of the resilient servers, when the hang failure occurs to the node then the self-repair model is applied 
to repair the node from the hang condition. Both on the VMM and container, we use the halt command to trigger 
the hang condition on each node. Each node on the VMM and container has to send an ICMP packet to the SRN 
manager every minute to inform that the node is in normal condition. If the SRN manager did not receive an ICMP 
packet from the node that is running on the VMM or container then the SRN manager will assume that the node is in 
halt (faulty) condition. In this case the SRN manager instructs the virtualization engine to reset the faulty node. 
When the SRN manager is on the same physical server as the faulty node, the SRN manager directly instructs the 
virtualization engine to reset it. However, if the SRN manager is on a different physical server then the SRN 
manager instructs the remote virtualization engine to reset the faulty node through SSH protocol.  
The hang failure that not only occurs on the node but also occurs in the virtualization engine (e.g., CVE-2015-
53074) could cause all of the nodes inside the virtualization engine to stop functioning. When this happens in the 
virtualization engine, the SRN manager implements the switching-repair model by activating the standby node on 
the other virtualization engine. Meanwhile, the network administrator manually identifies and solves the problem. 
Compared to the previous type of resilient server (type 2 to type 4), the type 8 of resilient has an ability to avoid the 
hang failure that happens on a homogeneous virtualization engine. 
6.2. Denial of service (DoS) 
Since we assume that the DoS attack is based on the TCP connection, we use slowhttptest15 to simulate the DoS 
attack to hamper the web services. When the DoS attack is detected on one of the nodes in type 8 of the resilient 
server, then it will provide the attackers IP address to the SRN manager. Mixed-repair model is applied by the SRN 
manager to protect the node by adding the attackers IP address to the firewall rule. The mixed-repair model 
implements two action models. The first model, self-repair is implemented by adding the IP address of the attacker 
to the firewall rule in the node that is being attacked. Meanwhile, the mutual-repair is implemented by adding the IP 
address of the attacker to the firewall rule in both of virtualization engines (VMM and container) using iptables 
command in forward table. The entire packet from the attacker will be dropped by the firewall on both of the 
virtualization engines. On the previous type of resilient server (type 2 to type 4), the node only protects the node 
itself from the DoS attack, while in the type 8, the SRN manager helps the node to protect the others.  
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6.3. Malware 
In the malware scenario, the SRN manager applied self-repair and switch-repair model.  Since we use a 
heterogeneous environment for the nodes, it is hard to apply the mutual-repair model to the SRN manager. The 
mutual-repair model can be applied when the environment is homogeneous so that the normal node can repair the 
abnormal node by copying the normal component to the abnormal node18. On the type 8 of resilient server, when the 
malware infects the node then the node will respond by cleaning the malware by itself. However when the malware 
remains present the SRN manager instructs the virtualization engine to shutdown the abnormal node and switch to 
the other nodes that have the same service. In this case the SRN manager has to search the equivalent node of the 
abnormal node on both the VMM and container. 
In this paper we only use two virtualization engines, XEN as VMM and LXC as container. We have to consider 
that the diversity of virtualization engines could increase the resilience of the server. However, when we decide to 
use many different virtualization engines then the consequence is that the SRN manager has to accommodate all of 
the features of the virtualization engine. 
7. Conclusion 
We implemented the Self-repair network (SRN) model to the type 8 of resilient server where this type has a higher 
diversity of resilient server than in our previous work18,19,20. This diversity includes applications (service), guest 
OSes, and virtualization engines. Further, in this work we added a new diversity to the resilient server by adding 
multiple virtualization engines. The result of the experiment shows that the diversity virtualization engines are able 
to rescue the nodes (servers) from function stoppage since the other virtualization engine is able to replace the faulty 
virtualization engine to keep the service running. In addition, the higher diversity of the resilient server will make 
the server more resilient, but we have to consider that this diversity causes the SRN manager to work harder. 
Further, in order to increase the resilience of the entire system we need equip the SRN manager with the action, 
which applied the SRN model. 
In the future, we will distribute the SRN manager on each physical server machine so that the SRN manager can 
provide higher availability than the current design. In this work, the SRN manager is only provided by one of the 
physical servers. When physical servers who provide the SRN manager encounter a failure, there is no SRN 
available to monitor and respond to the threat to the server. 
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